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Abstract—Computer networks today typically do not provide
any mechanisms to the users to learn, in a reliable manner,
which paths have (and have not!) been taken by their packets.
Rather, it seems inevitable that as soon as a packet leaves the
network card, the user is forced to trust the network provider
to forward the packets as expected or agreed upon. This can be
undesirable, especially in the light of today’s trend toward more
programmable networks: after a successful cyber attack on the
network management system or Software-Defined Network (SDN)
control plane, an adversary in principle has complete control over
the network.
This paper presents a low-cost and efficient solution to detect
misbehaviors and ensure trustworthy routing over untrusted or
insecure providers, in particular providers whose management
system or control plane has been compromised (e.g., using a cyber
attack). We propose Routing-Verification-as-a-Service (RVaaS):
RVaaS offers clients a flexible interface to query information
relevant to their traffic, while respecting the autonomy of the net-
work provider. RVaaS leverages key features of OpenFlow-based
SDNs to combine (passive and active) configuration monitoring,
logical data plane verification and actual in-band tests, in a novel
manner.
I. INTRODUCTION
While improving the security of the Internet routing system
has been a prime concern for many years already, the interface
between Internet users (including companies) and the network
provider (e.g., the carrier or datacenter operator) has received
little attention. Today, the user typically does not even have
any means to specify desired and undesired routing paths (e.g.,
using white or black lists), and even less is supported in terms
of verification. Rather, it is often implicitly assumed that the
user needs to trust its network provider, including its network
management system software, unconditionally.
While traceroute and trajectory sampling tools may be
sufficient to verify routes in regular networks [6], [8], and may
still perform well in the context of faulty and heterogeneous
networks [7], [38], they are insufficient in non-cooperative and
adversarial environments: an unreliable network operator may
simply not reply with the correct information, also breaking
any scheme based on packet labeling or tagging [30], [46].
Even more challenging than verifying the used paths, is to test
avoidance, i.e., verifying that certain paths have not been taken
and certain destinations have not been reached [22].
The threats introduced by untrusted providers are manifold.
In particular, routing can be compromised even in scenarios
where the provider itself is in principle benign. For example,
over the last years, numerous flaws have been found in network
management systems [27]. The problem is exarcerbated in
Software-Defined Networks (SDNs) [14]: A new SDN control
plane may be vulnerable to cyber attacks, which, given the
important role the SDN controller plays compared to more
distributed legacy network protocols, is particularly worrying:
an adversary with access to the control plane can in principle
arbitrarily change the network forwarding behavior, and violate
security policies (e.g., breaking logical isolation domains
between health care providers [17]) or exfiltrate confidential
traffic. Today, clients do not have a means to reliably verify
the data plane configuration.
At first sight, the problem seems to be an inherent one:
as soon as the packet enters the provider network, its fate is
inevitably decided by the provider and its network management
system and software control plane. While a (possibly signed)
acknowledgment from the receiver may eventually confirm
to the sender that the packet has successfully arrived, this
is insufficient as it does not provide any information about
which paths have been taken and which (possibly additional)
destinations have been reached. The problem is particularly
cumbersome in the context of high-performance networks
where cryptographic per-packet operations (like encryption,
signatures, etc.) are out of question.
This paper is motivated by the question whether it is possible
to reduce the seemingly inevitable trust assumptions in the
network provider, and to empower the user to verify the
routes taken and destinations reached by its packets. Ideally,
the resulting solution should also not introduce significant
computational overheads, and also respect the autonomy of the
network operator: security and business critical details of the
underlying topology should not be revealed.
A. Our Contributions
This paper presents Routing-Verification-as-a-
Service (RVaaS), a novel network service which allows
users (or more generally: clients) to query and verify relevant
properties of the network routes installed on their behalf.
RVaaS removes the need for users to unconditionally trust
the network providers to forward their packets according to
the agreed upon routing policies, and also accounts for the
possibility that operators or control software is compromised,
e.g., due to a cyber attack.
RVaaS is based on passively and actively monitoring network
configurations, and on the in-band interception of user request
messages (e.g., using OpenFlow Packet-ins). Upon a query
request, RVaaS performes a static packet trajectory analysis
(identifying relevant endpoints), and actively issues verfication
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packets and client authentication tests (e.g., the verify that
endpoints are legitimate).
RVaaS features the following properties:
1) Verifiable routing properties: Users can learn about and
verify, through a flexible interface, relevant information
related to the routes taken by their packets, such as
the set of destinations, or whether fairness conditions
are fulfilled (e.g., regarding bandwidth allocations). For
example, users can verify that their traffic is not routed
in a way which violates privacy, e.g., is not exfiltrated
or routed through certain geographic regions.
2) Confidentiality: The autonomy of the provider is pre-
served, and security or business critical topological details
can be kept confidential.
One attractive feature of our approach is that it allows users to
issue very general queries, which are not limited to connectivity
alone, but may also include geographic, performance and
fairness aspects. Another feature is the provided modularity:
queries may not be limited to a single provider but may
recursively span consecutive networks along a route.
To provide the RVaaS service, it is sufficient to deploy a
single secure server, somewhere in the network; additional (in-
dependent) servers can increase the security further. These
servers do not have to inspect live traffic, and have low resource
requirements; they also does not come with strict latency
requirements.
B. Paper Scope and Novelty
We emphasize that the goal of our approach is to empower
the users to detect misbehavior, as opposed to prevent misbe-
havior. In other words, alone, our approach is unable to ensure a
user’s packets will not traverse certain network regions or reach
certain destinations. However, we believe that the possibility to
detect misbehavior can often be a strong disincentive to deviate
from the correct behavior. Moreover, we in this paper do not
consider the orthogonal question of how a user should specify
its desired and undesired routes to the network provider.
Generally, we believe that our work assumes an interesting
position in the secure routing space. While there has been
much interest in securing the inter-domain routing protocol or
in dealing with unreliable data plane components, we study
how to reduce trust assumptions in the entity installing the rules
on the routers in a single administrative domain. Moreover,
we make the case for marrying verification mechanisms in
the “logical space” (e.g., which routes exist?), with physical
verification mechanisms in the data plane (e.g., which host
destinations are actually reached?).
We also note that while for RV aaS, any secure server is
in principle sufficient, our architecture can also benefit from
the advent of novel hardware developed in the context of Intel
SGX [9], [16], [23], [36]. In this respect, we see our work also
as an interesting case study demonstrating a new application
of this technology in the context of secure routing.
C. Organzation
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II provides necessary background on SDN/OpenFlow. Sec-
tion III introduces our model together with some terminology.
RVaaS is described in detail in Section IV. After reviewing
related work in Section V, we conclude our contribution in
Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
The solution proposed in this paper is tailored for Software-
Defined Networks (SDNs), and we will provide the necessary
background accordingly in this section.
In a nutshell, Software-Defined Networks (SDNs) outsource
and consolidate the control over the data plane devices (the
switches or routers) to a logically centralized software controller.
This decoupling introduces flexibilities and innovation oppor-
tunities, as the control plane can now evolve independently
from the constraints of the data plane [11]. OpenFlow is the
de facto SDN protocol standard today. OpenFlow is based on a
match-action concept: OpenFlow switches store rules a.k.a. flow
entries (installed by the controller) consisting of a match and
an action part. A packet matched by a certain rule will be
subject to the associated action. For example, an action can
define a port to which the matched packet should be forwarded,
or add or change a tag (a certain part in the packet header).
In OpenFlow networks, the distinction between switches and
routers disappears: an OpenFlow switch can match (and apply
actions to) not only layer-2 but also layer-3 and layer-4 header
fields.
An OpenFlow switch can (and should) be connected to
one or multiple controllers via an authenticated and secure
communication channel (e.g., SSL/TLS).1 Thus, only legitimate
controllers can send rule updates to the switch.
In order for the controller to learn about newly arriving flows,
OpenFlow switches can forward packets to the controller by
sending them within so-called Packet-In messages. Similarly
other events (link failures, switch errors, etc.) are reported as
well to the controller using dedicated OpenFlow messages.
As a reaction to such events, a controller may want to change
the installed flow on the switch (using Flow-Mod commands) or
explicitly send packets out from the switch (using Packet-Out).
Moreover, to stay informed about the current configuration of
a switch (the existing flow entries), the controller should use
the OpenFlow add flow monitor command.
III. MODEL AND THREAT
We consider a software-defined network servicing multiple
clients which are geo-spatially distributed. The client and
provider roles are defined as follows:
1) The Clients (or Users): We will refer to the users
or communication endpoints of the network as the
clients. Each client may be connected to the network
infrastructure at multiple access points (switch ports),
1We note however that according to a 2013 study, only 2 out of 8 OpenFlow
switches and 1 out of 8 (popular) OpenFlow controllers fully support. [2]
and request connectivity and routing services (regarding
his access points) from the provider.
2) The Provider: The provider running the software-
defined network consists of two parts:
a) Network management system and control plane: A
software in charge of defining and installing the
device configuration (e.g., routing policies), within
the constraints defined by the clients.
b) Infrastructure: Routers (resp. OpenFlow switches)
and links.
We consider a threat model motivated by cyber attacks: an
external attacker which compromised the network management
or control plane (e.g., using a Trojan or a remote cyber attack)
aims to change the data plane configuration, e.g., to divert
client traffic to unsupervised access points or through undesired
jurisdiction, thereby putting the security of the network and the
traffic privacy at risk. However, while the network management
system and control plane may be hacked, we assume the
infrastructure to be secure: The question of what security
properties can be guaranteed in scenarios where control planes
can be compromised and malicious while the data plane is
correct, is scientifically interesting on its own right. However,
we argue that the question is also a practically relevant one,
in three respects:
• While a cyber attacker (not an insider!) may be able to
hack the management and control plane, it is impossible
to change physical configurations from remote locations.
• In the context of network virtualization, the physical
infrastructure provider and the virtual network operator
are often considered two different roles. In this respect,
our model can be understood as a case study of how to
deal with a malicious virtual network operator.
• Our model can also be motivated by the current trend
toward more trusted hardware (see, e.g., Intel SGX).
The clients can also be untrusted in our model, and may for
example not inform the sender about having received packets,
or may try to infer confidential details about the network
topology.
Our objective is to enable a trustworthy routing, by empow-
ering a client to find out about and verify relevant properties
of the routing applied to its packets (e.g., the set of reached
destinations). Moreover, the autonomy of the provider should
be preserved. In particular, clients should not be able to infer the
topology or critical features (like bottlenecks) of the network
itself. Finally, details of the client should not leak: the provider
should not learn about their queries (whose content is somewhat
confidential).
In general, we assume a high-speed network (e.g., Internet
backbone or datacenter), where per-packet encryptions or
public key operations are hardly used due to the high costs
of deploying and maintaining them. Concretely, we rule out
signed logs in every packet, per-flow state in forwarders (which
stymies fail-over), and ideally not even per-flow public key
operations.
In summary:
• Switches are trusted (e.g., bought from a trusted vendor),
and are initially configured correctly.
• Internal network ports are known, and follow a well-
defined wiring plan.
• Links are trusted: no physical taps are installed.
• Switch to RVaaS controller sessions are secured, using
encrypted OpenFlow sessions and apriori configured
switch certificates for authentication.
IV. TRUSTWORTHY ROUTING
We will first discuss the main ideas and concepts behind
Routing-Verification-as-a-Service (RVaaS). Subsequently, we
give an example and discuss extensions and limitations.
A. Main Concepts
At the heart of RVaaS lies a flexible interface which allows
the clients to query relevant information related to how their
packets are being forwarded in the network. The interface
allows clients to ask questions such as:
• Which destinations (resp. other clients and hosts) can
be reached by the traffic leaving my network card? This
question may also be made more specific, e.g., constrained
to traffic within a certain header space.
• For which sources (e.g., other clients, hosts) currently
exist routing paths which can reach my network card?
Again, the question can be made more specific.
• Is my traffic forwarded fairly, e.g., according to network
neutrality principles?
Generally, queries related to connectivity, path lengths
optimality, traversed geographic regions, traffic shaping, quality-
of-service (e.g., dedicated bandwith), etc. are supported. A
client may also request a compact representation of the transfer
function of its offered routing service.
Through attestation, the client can verify that RV aaS is
the one that securely responds to its queries. Moreover, the
provider makes sure that the correct RV aaS application is
operating on the server, and not a fake one that may leak
sensitive information regarding the infrastructure or clients.
RVaaS is based on a passive-active approach: events in
the data plane are monitored, and analyzed in the control
plane; upon a client request, endpoints are actively tested
and authenticated. RVaaS can be realized using a stand-alone
OpenFlow controller, henceforth called RVaaS controller, which
monitors the configurations of all the switches, and which
may send and receive (resp. intercept and inject) specific
messages in-band, in order to communicate with the clients.
This controller is different from possibly additional controllers
used by the network provider to manage the network, and
should be trusted. Also, while a single one is in principle
enough, different entities (e.g., a certification authority) may
provide different independent controllers, reducing the attack
surface further.
In order to provide its service, the RVaaS controller per-
forms three different functions: passive or active configuration
monitoring, logical data plane verification, and actual in-band
testing using client interaction.
  
1
Integrity
request
packet
2
OpenFlow
Packet
In
3
3
OpenFlow
Packet
Out
4
Auth
request
packet4
A
A
A
B B B
RvaaS
controller
Fig. 1. A client makes an integrity request to the RVaaS controller. The
RVaaS controller analyzes the request and then dispatches Auth(entication)
request packets to relevant clients.
1) Configuration Monitoring: Our stand-alone RVaaS con-
troller is secured (i.e., installed correctly, and cannot be
influenced by the network provider) and connected to all
switches, via authenticated and encrypted OpenFlow sessions.
Through these sessions, the controller maintains an up-to-
date snapshot of the network configuration, either passively
(monitoring events) or actively (query the switch state or
issue and later intercept LLDP like packets through all internal
ports). This information is acquired in a manner that cannot
be exploited by an untrusted operator.
2) Logical Verification: In order to answer client queries,
relevant routes are computed in the logical space, given the
current network snapshot collected by the RVaaS controller.
For example, the RVaaS controller may perform Header Space
Analysis [17], or simply emulate the network based on the
current configuration.
3) In-band Test & Client Interaction: The RVaaS controller
has active access to the network traffic in order to collect user
requests/queries. Such client messages have distinct properties
(e.g., destination address, VLAN tag, etc.) that allow them
to be matched at the (ingress) switches and reported to the
controller. In addition each client knows the public key of the
RVaaS controller, allowing it to encrypt messages and verify
authenticity of the results.
In some cases, answering user requests, involves sending
further requests (e.g., using OpenFlow packet-out commands).
For example, these packets trigger destination clients to
respond to the querying clients, in an authenticated manner
(authentication requests). Towards this end, clients run a
software which responds to our authentication requests, in user
space, publishing themselves by sending a UDP packet (with
a specific magic header field value which can be intercepted
and traced back to the origin, due to the logically centralized
view). Concretely, in order to not expose RV aaS to cyber
attacks itself, our solution is based on in-band interception
(namely OpenFlow packet-ins) of user request messages (e.g.,
using a magic header value); responses are sent via packet-outs.
That is, RV aaS is only reachable via a very simple OpenFlow
interface and indirectly; no special protocols and servers are
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Fig. 2. Relevant clients send Auth(entication) reply packets back to the
RVaaS controller which collects the replies and sends them back to the
requesting client.
needed.
In general, the security of our architecture relies on the
integrity of the secure hardware, as well as on the frequency of
the network snapshot it takes. In particular, RV aaS needs to
ensure that it receives all the relevant updates from the switches.
This is guaranteed in our setting where OpenFlow switches are
reliable. However, additionally, it is also possible for RV aaS
to proactively query the switches for their current configuration.
The latter however needs to happen at random times, which
are hard to guess for the adversary. This is important as
otherwise, the adversary may simply set the correct rules for the
short time periods in which the box checks the configuration.
Short term reconfiguration attacks can also be prevented by
maintaining some history. Regarding the confidentiality of the
network topology and respecting the provider’s autonomy, our
architecture offers many flexibilities. In particular, queries can
be limited to learn only about endpoints, but nothing about the
actual routing paths inside the network.
B. Case Studies
Let us consider some relevant case studies. We refer the
reader to Figures 1 and 2 for some illustrations.
1) Isolation Checks: One of the most fundamental security
queries supported by RVaaS regards whether the sub-networks
where different clients are located, are isolated from each
other: no client can gain access to another client’s network
except through some access points used by the client. Failing
to guarantee such a requirement makes the client vulnerable to
join attacks in which an attacker first manipulates the network
operation, and secretly adds access points which can then be
used to access and/or damage client assets (such as private
data or hardware) managed by the network.
Our system can detect violations of isolation as follows: a
client request, sent through an access point (the request point),
is intercepted at an ingress switch and reported through a
Packet-In to the system server. Based on its current network
view, the server computes all the possible access points
that can communicate with the request point, e.g., using
reachability tests based on Header Space Analysis. Given these
access points, the server issues a Packet-Out message at the
corresponding outgress ports of the network. The hosts behind
these ports respond, with authenticated messages, which are
intercepted and reported to the server. The collection of these
authenticated messages are then forwarded to the querying
client, which can verify the correctness and authenticity of
these destinations.
Note that the server also forwards to the client the total
number of authentication requests that were made, such that it
can detect cases where some access points did not respond.
2) Geo-Location Checks: As a second case study, we present
a query made by a client to discover the locations where
its traffic passes through. This is relevant, e.g., in scenarios
where different jurisdictions exercise different privacy policies
regarding user data. First we require that the locations of all
the switches (and preferably also the links) are known to the
RVaaS controller. These locations can be revealed/estimated
in each of the following ways: (1) either disclosed by the
infrastructure provider; (2) collected from the clients themselves
in a crowd-sourcing manner: clients can e.g., report their
geographical locations which allows RV aaS to guess the
location of nearby switches; (3) or passively inferred from
clients traffic, e.g., using geo-IP mappings, domain name
records information, time zone estimations, etc.
Given a client geo-location request, the RVaaS controller
uses header space analysis to find out all the intermediate and
end point switch (and link) of any possible route for the client.
Then using the locations of the network provider components,
the set of locations exposed to the client traffic is computed
and sent to the client.
C. Extensions and Discussion
This section provides a discussion of our approach, and
identifies limitations and extensions.
a) Multi-Provider Settings: While we have described
our architecture for a single-provider setting, in principle,
our approach can also be used across multiple providers.
In this case, queries need to be propagated between the
RV aaS servers of the respective providers. Clearly, the trust
assumptions then need to be extended accordingly, to those
servers as well.
b) Supported Queries: In principle, a wide range of
queries can be supported within our framework, beyond simply
identifying reachable clients. For example, given the up-to-date
network view, performance and fairness related queries by
clients may be answered. Moreover, RV aaS could be used to
check whether allocated routes and meter tables meet network
neutrality requirements. Moreover, a slightly more complex
service may also maintain some history of the recent past,
allowing RV aaS for example to traceback the ingress port of
an attack.
V. RELATED WORK
Our paper assumes an interesting new position in the
secure routing space. Arguably the most intensively-studied
problem in the secure routing literature regards how to ensure
authenticity and correctness of topology propagation and route
computation across multiple untrusted and insecure domains,
e.g., by extending [18], [31] or redesigning [20], [45] the
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). Moreover, the problem of
how to design secure routing protocols which allow to deal
with untrusted and insecure switches and routers currently
experiences a rennaissance [28], [29], [34]. In contrast, we in
this paper investigate mechanisms which empower the user to
deal with untrusted or insecure operators, subject to a cyber
attack (from an external adversary without physical access).
Our problem is also different from the recently introduced and
interesting malicious administrator problem [25], [37]: in that
problem, it is assumed that a network is redundantly managed
by multiple administrators or controllers, out of which only a
minority can be malicious. This allows for simple (yet crypto
intensive) secure solutions based on threshold objects and
majority decisions. In the context of operator networks, such a
redundancy is not available, and to the best of our knowledge,
the threats introduced by a malicious network operator have
not been studied before.
We are not the first to identify new security-related op-
portunities and challenges introduced by the software-defined
networking paradigm [14], [21], [32], also regarding traffic
monitoring [13], [41], [43]. While the static logic of RV aaS
can be implemented using Header Space Analysis (HSA) [17],
over the last years many alternative tools have emerged [19],
[24], [39]. These tools in turn rely on early works on
reachability by Xie et al. [42], and are not limited to switches
and routers but can also be employed, e.g., in the context
of firewalls [1], [10], [26], [44]. Our work is orthogonal
in the sense that RVaaS can benefit from such systems in
order to implement its query interface, while performing the
required authentication requests in the data plane. That is,
RVaaS in some sense combines data plane [3], [5], [12], [33]
and control plane [4], [15], [40] query systems, and issues
a minimal amount of requests in the data plane (e.g., to
collect information about attached clients). In this sense, our
work is also orthogonal to recent literature aiming to improve
the latency at which network monitoring information can be
retrieved [35].
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper initiated the study of trustworthy routing ar-
chitectures in the context of hacked and untrusted network
management systems and control planes, as well as malicious
virtual network operators. We have identified different require-
ments and different roles in such a setting, and provided a first
solution which, based on a secure but simple hardware, allows
to decouple the roles and empower clients to verify routing
properties while preserving the autonomy of the operator, e.g.,
by respecting the confidentiality of topological details.
While the underlying concepts may be more general, RV aaS
is particularly well-suited for SDNs based on OpenFlow: Open-
Flow’s match-action interface provides an ideal technological
basis for our approach. In particular, OpenFlow enables a
simplified monitoring of different equipment, the interception
and injection of packets in order to communicate with the
clients, without affecting existing services, and the centralized
view and analysis of the collected configuration.
Clearly, at least initially, RV aaS targets power users, but in
the longer run, may also be incorporated into security/privacy
products directly, and made available to end users. Our work
also raises the question why an operator would be willing to
install RV aaS. Besides the possibility to consolidate logical
network view and physical configuration (e.g., in scenarios
where the operators does not necessarily trust the SDN con-
troller software to be perfectly correct), we also see economic
incentives: a telco hosting one or multiple (independent)
RV aaS servers may appear to be more trustworthy to their
customers, which can constitute a business advantage. For
instance, customers relying on security-critical networks, such
as governmental networks, are likely to prefer certified telcos,
which offer an independent means of verification.
In general, we believe that our work assumes an interesting
new perspective on the classic topic of secure routing, in
several respects. For example, we believe that our distinction
of network operator from physical infrastructure provider is
an interesting and timely one, beyond the considered cyber
attack threat model: in the context of network virtualization and
with the ongoing infrastructure liberalization trend, network
operators are more and more seen as a business role which
may be independent from the infrastructure owner. Moreover,
while our assumption of trusted infrastructure is a strong one,
we believe that it constitutes more than an academic exercise:
given today’s trend toward trusted hardware, our work is timely
and provides an interesting new look on this trend from a
networking perspective.
We understand our work as a first step. In particular, while
we show the potential for a more trusted routing in less trusted
environments, much more research is required to understand
the minimal assumptions required to implement such an
architecture, as well as to understand the fundamental tradeoffs
in terms of security and performance. It is also clear that there
are inherent limitations to such a solution. For example, it
seems impossible to deal with untrusted network operators
who also have physical access to the network, at least in the
classical, non-quantum physics world.
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